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Rumor spreading on online social media is presenting a significant threat to 
society of post-truth epoch. Extensive efforts have been devoted to rumor 
identification and debunking, assuming that a specific rumor propagation is a 
single event network and neglecting possible interdependence between different 
rumor cascades. Here we study the collective propagation of multiple rumors, 
and surprisingly find a network of users that repeatedly participate in different 
rumor cascades. Though these repetitive users demonstrate minor difference at 
the level of single propagation network, they are found to form a significantly 
more intensive collaboration network from multiple rumor cascades compared 
to news propagation. The clique-like cluster formed by repetitive rumor 
spreaders can serve as a high quality feature for rumor identification and 
blocking targets for rumor prevention. Our findings can provide a better 
understanding of rumor spread by viewing multiple rumor propagations as one 
interacting rumor ecosystem, and suggest novel methods for distinguishing and 
mitigation based on rumor spreading history. 
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Rumors, mainly transmitted along the history by word of mouth, and have been 
involved in a "chain of subjects" who passed a story from "mouth to ear" without 
possibility to verify it1. Recently, the blooming of online social media like Twitter and 
its variant Weibo of China, has profoundly reshaped the manner of information 
communication2-6, especially manifested in rumors7-10. For example, in October 2008, 
a rumor that Apple’s CEO Steve Jobs suffered a major heart attack has been circulated. 
Although this rumor has been proven false, its rapid spreading and initial adoption as 
a fact by investors had substantial impact, resulting in a loss of $9 billion market 
value11. Rumor propagation can undermine the basic value of modern society 
networked by the mutual belief. According to the World Economic Forum, 
dis-intermediated circumstances unfortunately facilitate the spread of conspiracy 
theories, misinformation and rumors, which present one of the primary threats in our 
modern society12-13. 
 
With the recent explosion of new media channels, such as Facebook and Twitter, the 
identification and prevention of rumors became much more difficult. Thus, 
understanding the mechanisms of rumor spreading in online social media has attracted 
much efforts, developing various approaches such as model-based simulations 
including the well-presented Daley Kendall (DK) model14. Further studies consider 
various propagation characteristics on networks of diverse topologies15-19. Epidemic 
models have been also pervasively employed in modeling rumor cascades in terms of 
constructing estimators for rumor sources or understanding the impact of network 
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structures20-22. Later, with the pervasive permeation of social media and the 
continuous accumulation of rumor-related propagation footprints, data-driven 
solutions become possible and popular23-25. Recent studies have demonstrated the 
existence of echo chamber in rumor spread, i.e., homogeneous clusters that users 
interact mainly within similar kind of content26-27. Polarized users have been found 
significantly different in consuming scientific-like or conspiracy-like messages28. To 
combat these rumor cascades, different methods have been proposed. For example, 
measures of information credibility have been developed for filtering out rumors29, 
where both content and prorogation network have been used as features in rumor 
detection30-32. Meanwhile, based on digital traces collected from Facebook and 
Snopes, recent studies found that a rumor might cascade for weeks or months, and 
then become popular again through an external jolt8. Rumor prevention can be 
modeled as the minimization of 'bad' influence through identifying a subset of 
individuals that can be convinced to adopt the 'good'33. Unfortunately, it is found that 
debunking efforts seem ineffective in many rumor propagations34, while some 
debunking efforts may even reinforce the strength of rumor propagation. 
 
In the study of rumor dynamics, most previous efforts roughly simplified the rumor 
propagation into single processes, neglecting the fact that different rumors might be 
disseminated interdependently by the same group of users, over the online social 
network. We argue here that a more systematic and realistic view could be established 
through integrating the different single rumor's cascades into collective multiple 
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interactions. Hence in the present study, based on empirical dataset collected from 
Weibo, one of the most trended social media in China, the interactions between 
different rumor retweeting networks (or news retweeting networks), due to repetitive 
spreaders, are thoroughly investigated. It is found that repetitive users participating in 
the rumor propagation show the trace of stronger collaboration than repetitive users in 
the propagation of authentic messages, which essentially helps the penetration of 
rumors in social media. These repetitive spreaders evolve into clique-like clusters 
forming a multilayer network, offering a novel proxy for rumor identification and 
blocking. Our findings based on analyzing collective social dynamics provide a 
broader perspective of rumor spreading understanding, which may enhance existing 
knowledge that emphasis semantic or propagation features of single cascades. 
 
Results 
Repetitive spreaders in rumor propagation. For each tweet in social media, either 
rumor or news, its propagation trace could be modeled as a retweeting network. A 
repetitive user is defined as a node participating in more than one retweeting network, 
as demonstrated in Fig 1(a). Intuitively, activeness (defined as R, see Methods for 
more details) of repetitive spreaders measures the frequency that the corresponding 
node attends in multiple propagations, in all rumor or news networks. Those users 
with high activeness (defined as key nodes) in different networks demonstrate greater 
vitality in the social media. Then, as Fig 1(b) shows, users attend in rumor or news 
networks are inclined to have many occurrences across different propagation events, 
suggesting the important role of these overlap nodes. Both distributions seem to 
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follow an approximated power law function with similar exponents. Note that nodes 
with extremely high R in news networks can be official media accounts that appear in 
many news propagation networks. These official media channels post much news and 
thus possess high activeness. However, as seen in Fig 1(c), connected pairs that 
represent retweeting relationships between two users, are found to have zero 
correlation of activeness for news propagation (see Methods and Fig. S1 for more 
details), while a positive correlation can be found mainly for rumors. In contrast to 
news, in rumors, nodes with higher R tend to link (with retweet) nodes that also 
possess high value of R. This suggests the possibility of collaboration between key 
nodes in rumors in contrast to real news. Thus, in both official and non-official news 
propagation, users behave more independently, compared to rumors. Note that the 
correlations of R values between two ends of edge in propagation network are further 
exploited in Fig. S1. 
 
Propagation properties of highly repetitive nodes (key nodes). While a group of 
users are found to show unexpected high activeness and appear repeatedly in multiple 
social information propagations, their structural properties might help to better 
understand their role in the information spreading. Here we define key nodes (k nodes) 
as repetitive nodes with high activeness (top 0.1% of highest R), which are marked in 
Fig 1b. It is seen in Fig 2a that in contrast to news, key nodes in rumors appear 
typically at larger distance from creators of propagation than distance one for news 
networks (see Fig. S3 for examples). Their high presence is mostly at layer three, 
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while the ordinary (non-key) nodes, see inset of Fig 2a, appear mostly in the first 
layer both in rumors and news. While the key nodes in layer one of news are mostly 
followers of news publisher, the concurrence of key nodes in layer three of rumor 
propagation network suggests possible coordination between these nodes. These key 
nodes also possess longer posting time ߂ݐ from the creating time of networks than 
those in news networks, as seen in Fig 2b. People tend to believe the rumors when it 
is made familiar by repetition, known as the continued-influence effect (CIE) 35-37. 
This suggests that key nodes usually participating in rumor propagations at later 
stages, possibly enhance the propagation intensity through repetition, behaving more 
like intensifiers rather than broadcasters in the news propagations.  
 
However, as shown in Fig. 2c, minor differences have been found in degree properties 
between key nodes of rumors and news. Interestingly, this similarity between rumor 
and news is broken in Fig. 2d (see Fig. S2 for more) when plotting the averaged 
out-degree of nodes as a function of R value. This result shows that the repetitive 
users in rumor cascades seems to have a constant averaged out-degree close to one for 
all R, while key repetitive users in official news show two distinct tendencies. One 
group of key users with large activeness in official news has large out degree, 
illustrating their strong broadcasting impact. Another group of key users with small 
degree are obviously located on the edge of propagation network. When comparing 
results shown in Fig. 2c and 2d, we find that the structural behaviors of key nodes, 
like degree, in a single propagation network may appear similar between rumor and 
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fact (Fig. 2c). However, these two groups of key users become significantly 
distinguishable (Fig. 2d) when we consider their repetitive behaviors in multiple 
cascades.  
 
Emergence of a highly collaborative network behind rumors. Besides presence in 
single propagation, these key nodes may actually interact and collaborate in multiple 
events of rumor cascades. To understand this, we construct a ‘co-author’ network (C 
network) to study the possible collaborative relations between these key nodes, which 
emerge during the evolution of multiple propagation networks. Nodes in this network 
are key nodes (or k nodes), links are added if two key nodes appear in the same rumor 
propagation. This kind of collaborative network is common to analyze in social 
networks such as scientific collaboration networks 38, and can signify how these 
repetitive users collaborate. The first question we ask here is how this collaboration 
network emerges with time. As demonstrated in Fig 3a, we rank the two sets of 
propagation events (rumor or news) according to their creating time, and build C 
networks by the following rules: first we include all of key nodes into the C network; 
if two key nodes appear in the same original propagation network, we add an edge 
between these two nodes accordingly in the C network. This consideration is based on 
possible crowdturfing behavior that malicious users may be organized to enhance the 
rumor propagation through disguising themselves as weakly coupled ordinary users 39. 
Surprisingly, we find in Fig 3b that all key repetitive users in rumors can be identified 
in the very early stage of the whole period. This suggests that we need only a 
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relatively small sampling datasets of rumor propagation to identify most of these 
highly suspected repetitive users. This finding is independent of the starting point of 
collection process, as shown in the inset of Fig 3b and Fig. S4d. Compared with news, 
this fast integration of repetitive users in rumors is made of non-uniform bursts of 
increase, showing the correlated appearance of key users.   
 
The key repetitive users not only show fast integration from multi-cascades of rumors, 
but also have more concurrence probably due to higher coordination among them in a 
single propagation event. As shown in Fig. 3(c), connections between key repetitive 
users increase much faster in rumor than that in fact, suggesting that on average each 
key user will have more partners of other key users in a given propagation network. 
As a result, it is seen in Fig 3(d) that the distance between these key nodes in the 
rumor collaboration network is much smaller than that of news, demonstrating the 
trace of organized behavior due to intensive collaboration between k users in rumor 
propagation. This is further demonstrated in Fig 3(e) that, while for news these highly 
collaborative users form gradually modular sub-structures 40, rumor key nodes are 
becoming a densely connected single group rapidly. For further properties of the C 
networks see Fig. S4. 
 
Prediction and mitigation of rumor propagation based on key nodes. Hundreds of 
thousands of different rumors have been found in online social networks 7. Facing 
such big data of rumor cascades, it remains challenging how to generate useful 
information from these historical datasets for combating future rumors. Once we 
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accumulate a fraction of rumor propagation data, it becomes possible to identify the 
key repetitive users from these interconnected propagation network and build their 
collaboration network, which will bring new features for distinguishing between 
rumors and news. To detect the influence of key nodes, we define Rk as the relative 
size of the branches of the k nodes (see Methods) in a given propagation network and 
find Rk can be useful feature to distinguish rumors from facts. It is shown in Fig 4(a) 
that the probability of a given propagation network to belong to rumors is increasing 
fast with increasing Rk. Probability of being a rumor approaches 1.0 for Rk above 0.1. 
The distribution of Rk can be seen in Fig. S5, showing clearly that key nodes in 
rumors have typically larger Rk, thus more influential. Moreover, with the evolution of 
C network, we calculate the giant component G (as shown in Fig. S4a) of their 
collaboration network as the number of propagation networks (ni) increases. When we 
use G/ni for a given propagation network shown in Fig. 4b, it is found to be even a 
better distinction between rumors and news.  
 
Once we have a method to identify the susceptible rumors based on key nodes or 
other features, one can use it to perform a real-time mitigation by blocking potential 
influential spreaders. It is generally difficult to identify initiators of rumors at early 
stages, however, blocking the intensifiers in the propagation process might effectively 
weaken the spreading of rumors and avoid further bursts of rumor spread. When we 
remove a certain fraction of nodes in a given propagation network, the resulting giant 
component of network can measure the effect of different mitigation strategies, as 
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shown in Fig. 5. Here we compare the case where the nodes removal based on their R 
values (from high R to low R), with a random removal of the same fraction. It is seen 
in Fig. 5a that the removal of key nodes in rumor propagation networks generates a 
much larger damage compared to random removal. The damage made by removing 
key nodes in rumor is also much larger than that in news propagation (compare Figs. 
5a and 5b). Note that this happens despite of the fact that the structural properties 
such as out-degree distribution are similar for key nodes of rumor and news cascades, 
as seen in Fig. 2c. Thus, the reason for the higher impact of key nodes in rumors 
compared to news, is mostly due to their significant differences in collective effect 
from the network of networks that can better mitigate the rumor cascades. This points 
towards those nodes playing an important role in multiple cascades, which can serve 
as an effective option in the comprehensive combat against rumor propagations. 
 
Discussion 
On one hand, rumors are low-cost and low-tech communication weapons that can be 
used by anyone to disrupt the efforts of businesses, civil affairs, nation or other credit 
systems. On the other hand, rumors, as a collective ‘intelligence’ process, have been 
evolving and improving themselves due to the game process 41 together with the 
debunking efforts 42. With the increasing prevention abilities, rumors that survive, are 
becoming smarter than before, and are more difficult to distinguish, identify and 
eliminate. While this interaction and evolution is expected to become much more 
represented and resilient in the future ecology of rumors, our goal is to uncover its 
evolution features in order to enable effective debunking. 
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To achieve this goal, different technical approaches have been taken, including the 
development of denial platform from third party and tools based on machine learning 
methods. The denial platform of a third party usually relies on expensive yet slow 
manual recognition. Meanwhile, machine-learning based auto-recognition tools are 
insufficient against the lasting evolution of survival rumors, if they use a static 
combination of features. Rumor is analogous to the evolution of viruses, which 
requires continuous development of new drugs.  
 
One possibility of eliminating such evolving rumors is to study deep into their “DNA”, 
and identifying their fundamental mechanisms of reproduction. Here we find that 
among multiple rumor networks for different topics, there is a small group of special 
users (key nodes) showing trace of intensive collaboration in the different propagation 
networks, and thus, serving as a motor for rumor reproduction. This small group 
connecting multiple rumor cascades shows strong interactions inside the group (Fig. 
3), while in single networks they behave similar to real news (Fig. 2c). Our results 
show that repetitive users could provide useful features for rumor identification and 
mitigation. Therein, this group of key repetitive users provides us an opportunity to 
recognize, distinguish and even prevent the rumor evolution and their collective 
propagation, by viewing the different rumors as a whole network of networks.  
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Methods 
Database introduction. Focusing on the relationship of multiple rumor propagations, 
we begin by studying the different behaviors of repetitive spreaders in both rumor 
network and news network, in which nodes being users of Weibo and links being 
retweeting relationship. Rumors dataset containing 0.4k post were officially debunked 
by Weibo and news dataset containing 0.4k posts in total were posted by verified 
accounts of mainstream mass media. The retweeting traces of rumors and news were 
thoroughly collected through Weibo’s open APIs.  
 
Definition of key nodes. As shown in Fig 1a, one node might repetitively attend 
propagations of multiple message propagation networks either for rumors or news. 
These overlapped nodes are named repetitive users. To quantify the overlap level, i.e., 
the activeness of a repetitive user, denoted as R, is defined as the node appearance 
frequency 
                               nR
N
 ,                           (1) 
where n is the total number of propagation networks that the user attends, N is the 
total number of networks in the employed data set (for rumor N is 407 networks and 
426 for news networks). Moreover, we define the nodes with the top 0.1% highest 
activeness as key nodes, which present higher appearance frequency. In rumor 
propagation there are 302 key nodes in total and 477 key nodes in news propagation. 
We define the correlation of activeness between the connected nodes as follows: 
                    1 2 1 2
1 2
* *
*
R R R Rcorr
R R
      
 
,                 (2) 
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for each connected pair of nodes in multiple propagation networks, R1 and R2 are the 
R of both ends of an edge. 
 
Propagation features. As for rumor identification (see Fig. 4)，in each network, Rk is 
defined as 
                        
ki
k bs
k
net
N N
R
N

  ,                       (3) 
where Nk is the number of key nodes, Nbs is branch size of key nodes in the network 
and Nnet is the total number of nodes that attend in the given network. It is worth 
noting that in social media, the branch size can measure a spreader’s influence of 
contagion, because any message posted by the spreader will be firstly pushed to all 
their branched size and higher branch size implies more retweets in later propagations. 
Furthermore, probability of a random network belongs to rumor networks in each Rk 
section (P) is defined as 
                            
i
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,                          (4) 
where nri is the number of rumor networks in ith Rk section and Nr is the total number 
of rumor networks, nfi is the number of news networks in ith section and Nf is the total 
number of news networks.  
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Figures 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Repetitive spreaders in rumor propagations. (a) Demonstration of 
typical propagation networks of five rumors obtained from Weibo data. Repetitive 
spreaders are marked as non-red nodes in each network. We connect repetitive 
spreaders with lines and nodes of same color to demonstrate their repetitive 
occurrences. The creating time of each network is given in the figure. (b) PDF of R, 
the node appearance frequency in different rumors or news networks respectively. The 
label k (key nodes) represents the considered range of most active nodes (top 0.1%) 
for both rumor networks and news networks. Here we use log binning with 
normalization. (c) Probability distribution of corr, corr is the activeness correlation 
between each connected pair in event propagation. 
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Figure 2: Structural properties of highly repetitive nodes (key nodes) in 
propagation networks. (a) The probability distribution of layer of key nodes. Layer 
represents the hop distance between retweeter and creator of a propagating network. 
For each key node, we first calculate its average layer in all networks that it attends 
and then obtain a probability distribution of the average layer of key nodes. We also 
present the layer distribution of ordinary nodes (all nodes except for key nodes) in the 
inset.  (b) PDF of ߂ݐ of key nodes, ߂ݐ is defined as the interval between post-time 
of a key node and creating time of the corresponding network. Similarly, ߂ݐ of each 
key node is also averaged over the multiple networks it attends. PDF of ߂ݐ of 
ordinary nodes is also shown in the inset. (c) PDF of out-degree of key nodes in each 
network. (d) The averaged out-degree of nodes in the propagation networks as a 
function of R. 
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Figure 3: Emergence of collaborative network. (a) Evolution of C network with the 
increasing collaborations of key nodes as the number of propagation networks 
increases, ranked according to their creating time. Here we only show the large 
connected components in C network. (b) The fraction of distinct k nodes (Pk) grows as 
the number of sorted networks increases. We repeat the same process when starting 
from the 100th propagation network in inset figure. (c) Average degree of C network 
as the number of network increases. (d) Average distance between nodes in the giant 
connected component of C network decreases with the growing number of networks. 
(e) Modularity of C network decreases when the number of networks increases. 
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Figure 4: Repetitive users as prediction feature. (a) For each network, we calculate 
the fraction of k nodes and their branch size in the network as the Rk of the network. 
Here we only consider the non-official news and rumor. For each Rk section, we 
calculate the probability (P) that a random network belongs to rumor network. Three 
vertical lines divide the whole dataset (rumor and non-official news) into 4 parts with 
equal number of networks sorted by Rk values. For example, “25%” stands for having 
25% of the networks in this area. (b) Size of collaborative networks. We calculate G/ni 
as the C network grows when the number of networks increases, where G is the giant 
component fraction of the C network and ni is the number of added propagation 
networks. Here we only consider the non-official news and rumor in the C network 
growing process.   
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Figure 5: Mitigation of rumor cascades using repetitive users. Here we remove the 
nodes randomly, or based on their R values (in a descending order). For each fraction, 
we delete the target nodes in each propagation network and calculate the giant 
component proportion (G) of the propagation network. Here we only consider and 
compare the propagation networks with repetitive users. Panel (a) and (b) are the G as 
a function of deleting fraction in rumor and news respectively.  
